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“[O]ur system of democracy teaches that the will of the people, important as 
it is, does not reign absolute but must be kept in harmony with our Constitution.” 
—Judge Thelton Henderson1 
 
 Imagine the voters of South Dakota—the first state to adopt initiative and 
referendum2 on a statewide level—mounted a successful campaign to amend the 
state constitution as follows: Any law regarding the spending of state funds in public 
education for noncitizens shall require a supermajority in both Houses for enactment. Prior 
 
* Margaux Poueymirou is a 2015 graduate of the University of California, Irvine School of Law. She 
would like to thank Erwin Chemerinsky, Mario Barnes, Mark Rosenbaum, and Nicholas Hartmann 
who each contributed to this Note in their own great ways. Thanks as well to the Law Review for their 
attentive and thorough assistance.  
1. Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. 1480, 1490 (N.D. Cal. 1996), vacated, 110 F.3d 
1431 (9th Cir. 1997). 
2. An initiative enables a prescribed number of voters in a state or local community to place an 
amendment or proposal on the ballot for acceptance by the voters in that locality. A referendum is a 
device that requires voters of a state or community to approve of specified legislative enactments before 
they become law. See Priscilla F. Gunn, Initiatives and Referendums: Direct Democracy and Minority 
Interests, 22 URB. L. ANN. 135, 135 nn.1–2 (1981) (citing GEORGE S. BLAIR, AMERICAN 
LEGISLATURES: STRUCTURE AND PROCESS 392 (1967)). 
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to this amendment, laws affecting the rights of noncitizens, like all other laws in the 
state, required your standard simple majority for enactment. By facially singling out 
a suspect class (noncitizens) for unique and unfair treatment, this initiative would 
expressly violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The question this Note explores, however, is whether an additional equal 
protection claim could be raised in relation to the way the initiative restructures the 
political process. This restructuring occurs in two ways: first, by embedding the 
initiative’s repeal in the state constitution; second, by requiring a supermajority for 
the enactment of any future spending laws regarding a particular class of individuals. 
In so doing, the initiative creates comparative structural burdens within the political 
process for individuals seeking to advance legislation that might be to their benefit 
or to the benefit of noncitizens living in the state. In order to do away with the 
supermajority requirement, the state constitution would have to be reamended; in 
order to pass a law that altered state spending on public education in relation to 
noncitizens, a supermajority would have to succeed. 
Although it is true that if citizens can amend state constitutions, they can 
reamend them as well, there is still something acutely troubling about voters 
adopting laws that are procedurally more difficult for future voters to amend, repeal, 
or modify. This is particularly the case when such laws affect the rights of minority 
groups that have been historically disenfranchised within the political system. When 
these laws are couched in facially neutral language, they will inevitably escape 
heightened judicial review so long as strict scrutiny requires evidence of 
discriminatory intent—a nearly impossible threshold to meet in relation to citizen-
driven referenda and ballot initiatives. 
This Note focuses on a series of cases comprising the “‘political process’ 
doctrine,”3 in which the Supreme Court developed a unique or unconventional 
form of equal protection analysis to respond to various forms of “political 
restructuring” that affected minority rights.4 All of the cases involved citizen-driven 
initiatives that altered sources and avenues of decision-making power in relation to 
certain social policy issues, ranging from fair housing to affirmative action. In each 
instance, the alteration of decision-making power made it more difficult for certain 
individuals to adopt future legislation, change social policy, or engage in successful 
advocacy in relation to particular issues. 
Part II of this Note traces the history of the political process doctrine. 
Beginning with the seminal Supreme Court cases from which this mode of analysis 
emerged, this section examines the ways that courts developed an equal protection 
 
3. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1632 (2014). Courts have 
invariably used different terms for the same idea, ranging from the “political restructuring doctrine,” 
e.g., Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 701 F.3d 466, 495 (6th  
Cir. 2012), to the “Hunter Principle” in reference to Hunter v. Erickson, from which this approach to 
equal protection jurisprudence first emerged, see Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969). 
4. See Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982); Hunter, 393 U.S. at 392–93; 
Wilson, 110 F.3d 1431. 
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framework to respond to a unique equal protection concern regarding minority 
groups and their access to and strength within the political process. Part III 
examines the controversy surrounding Proposition 2, Michigan’s Civil Rights 
Initiative and the Supreme Court’s decision in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend 
Affirmative Action.5 Part IV examines Schuette’s afterlife in the same-sex marriage 
cases and the tension between direct democracy and judicial review. Finally, Part V 
proposes a new framework for honoring the doctrine’s central objectives without 
succumbing to the same legal vulnerabilities. 
II. THE BIRTH OF A DOCTRINE 
The political process doctrine originates with the 1969 Supreme Court case 
Hunter v. Erickson.6 But it is also rooted in, or foreshadowed by, the “most 
celebrated footnote in constitutional law,”7 United States v. Carolene Products’ 
footnote four, from which our tiers of scrutiny emerged.8 Indeed, as Justice 
Sotomayor stated in her dissent in Schuette: “The values identified in Carolene 
Products lie at the heart of the political-process doctrine.”9 
Writing for the Court in Carolene Products, Justice Harlan Fiske Stone alluded 
to laws or conditions that did not enjoy “a presumption of constitutionality”10 such 
that the government must bear the burden of defending the law. This included 
“legislation which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be 
expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation.”11 The Court stated that 
such legislation should be “subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the 
general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of 
legislation.”12 Additionally, the Court singled out “prejudice against discrete and 
insular minorities” as a “special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the 
operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect 
minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial 
inquiry.”13 The Court’s recognition of the need for heightened judicial review 
coalesced, then, with a unique concern for protecting the integrity of the political 
process and minority voices within it. In essence, Carolene Products reinforced a 
belief in “the need for courts to check defects in pluralist democracy, by monitoring 
both its processes and the products—by clearing direct obstacles to participation 
 
5. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. 1623. 
6. Hunter, 393 U.S. at 391. 
7. Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Carolene Products Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REV 1087, 1087 (1982). 
8. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
9. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1668. 
10. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 148. 
11. Id. at 152 n.4. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. 
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and by paying close attention to laws that target groups most likely to be excluded 
from ordinary pluralistic bargaining.”14 
If Carolene Products foreshadowed the political process doctrine, the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Hunter is credited with its true creation. Indeed, later cases, when 
analyzing comparable equal protection political process claims, employed the phrase 
“Hunter principle”15 or “Hunter doctrine”16 to situate their analyses within 
appropriate case law.17 
The central issue in Hunter was whether the City of Akron, Ohio, violated the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when it amended its city 
charter to prevent the city council from implementing any housing ordinance that 
dealt with racial, religious, or ancestral discrimination without the approval of the 
majority of Akron’s voters. Nellie Hunter brought the action after a real estate agent 
informed her that he was under orders not to show any homes to African 
Americans.18 She reported this to the Commission on Equal Housing, which had 
been set up to enforce a recently enacted fair housing ordinance, and was told that 
the ordinance was no longer viable due to Section 137. Adopted in the wake of the 
city council’s enactment of fair housing legislation to address the gross disparities 
in the housing market that disproportionately affected the City’s African American 
community, Section 137 amended the city charter to ensure that voters played 
watchdog whenever housing legislation that contemplated racial integration was 
under consideration.19  
In an 8–1 decision, the Supreme Court held that the charter amendment 
violated equal protection.20 Prior to Section 137, no other ordinance required 
majority approval before going into effect. Therefore, the amendment not only 
repealed existing antidiscrimination housing legislation, it also altered the existent 
political process by “[drawing] a distinction between those groups who sought the 
law’s protection against racial, religious or ancestral discriminations in the sale and 
rental of real estate and those who sought to regulate real property transactions in 
 
14. Daniel P. Tokaji & Mark D. Rosenbaum, Promoting Equality by Protecting Local Power: A 
Neo-Federalist Challenge to State Affirmative Action Bans, 10 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 129, 136 (1999); 
see also Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the 
Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 802–03 (2006) (arguing that Carolene Products underscores the 
“notion that courts should police the political process for improperly motivated legislation” and that 
this “has become a prominent justification for judicial application of heightened review”). 
15. See, e.g., Lee v. Nyquist, 318 F. Supp. 710, 719 (W.D.N.Y. 1970), aff’d, 402 U.S. 935 (1971), 
aff’d sub nom., Chropowicki v. Lee, 402 U.S. 935 (1971). 
16. See, e.g., Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 616 F.2d 1381, 1390 n.15 
(9th Cir. 1980) (“We need not decide whether a statute explicitly singling out and prohibiting 
affirmative action programs would be facially neutral or would fall under the doctrine of Hunter  
v. Erickson.”) (citation omitted). 
17. See, e.g., Seattle, 458 U.S. at 469, 473. 
18. Hunter, 393 U.S. at 387. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. at 393. 
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the pursuit of other ends.”21 In essence, Section 137 forced the former group to run 
a “gantlet.”22 
The Court made several significant observations that later cases have 
employed when articulating and applying the political process doctrine. First, it 
stated that “treating racial housing matters differently from other racial and housing 
matters” created an “explicitly racial classification” and thus must be evaluated 
under the “most rigid scrutiny.”23 
Second, the Court emphasized the law’s disproportionate impact on minority 
groups and the “special burden” it placed on “racial minorities within the 
governmental process.”24 Tellingly, these burdens were analogized to voting rights 
cases including Anderson v. Martin25 where the Court had held that a law requiring 
candidates to specify their race on the ballot was unconstitutional.26 The Hunter 
Court also likened the impact of Section 137 to efforts to deny individuals a right 
to vote on an equal basis with others.27 As the Court stated, “the State may no more 
disadvantage any particular group by making it more difficult to enact legislation in 
its behalf than it may dilute any person’s vote or give any group a smaller 
representation than another of comparable size.”28 In so doing, the Court developed 
a vocabulary for an equal protection analysis that positioned itself within 
contemporaneous voting rights and legislative apportionment cases. 
Third, the Court addressed the potential significance that Section 137 was 
enacted via the ballot process: although the “State may distribute legislative power 
as it desires,” the State cannot adopt a legislative structure that violates the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and the implementation of legislative change through 
popular referendum does not immunize the State from judicial review.29 As the 
Court stressed, the sovereignty of the people remains subject to constitutional 
limitations. Because the City failed to justify this classification, Section 137 was held 
to be unconstitutional.30 
In Justice Harlan’s concurrence, he argued that laws defining “the powers of 
political institutions fall into two classes” for equal protection purposes: laws 
seeking to make it more difficult for racial and religious minorities to further their 
political aims, and laws “designed with the aim of providing a just framework within 
which the diverse political groups in our society may fairly compete and [which] are 
not enacted with the purpose of assisting one particular group in its struggle with 
 
21. Id. at 390. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. at 392 (citing Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944)). 
24. Id. at 391. 
25. Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399, 404 (1964). 
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. at 392–93. 
29. Id. at 392. 
30. Id. at 393. 
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its political opponents.”31 Justice Harlan’s central critique of Section 137 was that it 
had been adopted not on “the basis of any general principle” but, instead, had the 
“clear purpose” of making it more onerous for certain racial and religious groups to 
participate in the political process.32 
The lone dissenter, Justice Black, argued that the Court had grossly 
overreached its authority by refusing to allow a state to repeal laws deemed unwise. 
The Justice analogized the Court’s application “of the Equal Protection Clause to 
bar States from repealing laws that the Court wants the States to retain” with the 
Court’s development of what he considered equally problematic: substantive due 
process.33 Additionally, the Justice found the Majority’s reliance on voting cases to 
be terribly misguided. Instead of disenfranchising African American voters, Section 
137 did the opposite in his opinion: it gave the voters an opportunity to have a say 
in fair housing legislation. Thus, rather than undermining voter interests, Section 
137 protected them.34 
A central theme underscoring Hunter, which appeared in each opinion to 
varying degrees, was the relationship between direct democracy and judicial review. 
Additionally, the Justices grappled with different modes of defining what 
constituted a racial classification. As Professor Sunstein suggested in his analysis of 
Hunter, “[t]he true lesson of Hunter is that there is a category of classifications that 
qualify neither as facially neutral nor as facially discriminatory and that, while not as 
suspicious as the latter, ought not to receive the deference due to the former.”35 
A. Applications of the Hunter Principle 
In the fourteen-year period following Hunter and preceding Washington  
v. Seattle School District No. 1,36 the next major case to develop the doctrine, several 
federal and state courts relied upon Hunter to address and frame a variety of equal 
protection challenges.37 Courts frequently cited the case for the proposition that 
 
31. Id. at 393 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
32. Id. at 395. 
33. Id. at 396–97 (Black, J., dissenting). 
34. Id. at 397. 
35. Cass R. Sunstein, Public Values, Private Interests, and the Equal Protection Clause, 1982  
SUP. CT. REV. 127, 150 (1982). 
36. Seattle, 458 U.S. 457. 
37. See, e.g., Flores v. Pierce, 617 F.2d 1386, 1391 (9th Cir. 1980) (pointing to Hunter to articulate 
that “[i]f the rigors of the governmental or administrative process are imposed upon certain persons 
with an intent to burden, hinder, or punish them by reason of their race or national origin, then this 
imposition constitutes a denial of equal protection, notwithstanding the right of the affected persons to 
secure the benefits they seek by pursuing further legal procedures”) (citation omitted); Jones  
v. Diamond, 594 F.2d 997, 1012 (5th Cir. 1979) (footnote omitted) (citing Hunter for the proposition 
that “[i]n the inherently coercive setting of a jail, it is evident to us that the withdrawal of decision-
making by the public officials for only part of the jail amounts to impermissible racial segregation of 
prisoners.”), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on reh’g, 636 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir. 1981), overruled by Int’l Woodworkers 
of Am., AFL-CIO & its Local No. 5-376 v. Champion Int’l Corp., 790 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir. 1986); 
Bulluck v. Washington, 468 F.2d 1096, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (“The principle of Hunter is that the 
statute creates an ‘explicitly racial classification’ whenever it differentiates between the treatment of 
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when a neutral law adversely impacts a minority group, this is sufficient for 
sustaining an equal protection claim. For example, in the 1971 Supreme Court case 
Whitcomb v. Chavis—which involved an equal protection challenge to a state statute 
that diluted black voting strength by establishing Marion County, Indiana, as a 
multi-member district—the dissent drew analogies to Hunter, describing it as a case 
decided by the “basic principle” that “invidious effects” and not simply “racial 
motivat[ion]” are enough to establish an equal protection violation.38 
However, if certain courts interpreted Hunter as a discriminatory impact case, 
others treated it as facilitating a new framework for determining the existence of a 
racial classification. This is evident in Lee v. Nyquist, where a three-judge panel 
struck down a newly amended section of the N.Y. Education Code that forbade 
assigning students to different school districts in order to achieve racial balance 
“except with the approval of a local elected board or upon parental consent . . . .”39 
Prior to passage of the amendment, the Commissioner, state education officials, 
and school boards retained plenary authority over the decision making pertaining 
to the schools, including issues of attendance, maintenance of districts, and student 
assignments in all matters. Drawing upon Hunter to frame the substance of the equal 
protection violation at issue, the panel explained that “[the amendment] create[d] a 
single exception to the broad supervisory powers the state Commissioner of 
Education exercises over local public education”40 and that whenever a law 
“differentiates between the treatment of problems involving racial matters and that 
afforded other problems in the same area,” the law’s restructuring of the political 
process creates a racial classification.41  
Hunter was interpreted more as a case about race than a case about the integrity 
of the political process. This is evident in James v. Valtierra, a decision authored by 
Justice Black, the lone dissenter in Hunter.42 Valtierra involved an equal protection 
challenge to a state constitutional amendment that brought low-income public 
housing decisions within the referendum process.43 The amendment was adopted 
in the wake of a California Supreme Court decision that held “local authorities’ 
decisions on seeking federal aid for public housing projects were ‘executive’ and 
‘administrative,’ not ‘legislative,’ and therefore the state constitution’s referendum 
provisions did not apply to these actions.”44 In response to this determination, 
California voters amended the state constitution to ensure any decision to build a 
 
problems involving racial matters and that afforded other problems in the same area.”); Westbrook  
v. Mihaly, 2 Cal. 3d 765, 773 (1970) (relying upon Hunter to strike down ballot initiatives that “require[d] 
a two-thirds rather than a simple mathematical majority to approve the incurring of bonded 
indebtedness . . . .”). 
38. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 178 (1971). 
39. Lee, 402 U.S. 935. 
40. Id. (emphasis added). 
41. Id. (footnote omitted). 
42. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 138 (1971). 
43. Id. at 138–39. 
44. Id. at 138 (footnote omitted). 
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low-rent housing project received approval by a majority of those living in the 
community. Low-rent housing was singled out for mandatory referendums, while 
all other kinds of publicly assisted housing required no such approval. In upholding 
the state constitutional amendment and thus reversing the district court, Justice 
Black rejected the lower court’s reliance on Hunter.45 Because the state 
constitutional amendment in Valtierra involved no racial classification, Hunter was 
inapposite. Justice Black’s rejection of Hunter, therefore, suggests that the political 
process doctrine only applied when racial classifications were at issue. Comparative 
structural burdens within the political process that did not involve race, or a suspect 
class, were unable, standing alone, to sustain an equal protection challenge.46 
B. Rearticulating the Hunter Principle 
The first significant case to expand on the Hunter principle, however, was 
Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1.47 It involved an initiative that had been 
adopted to defeat a desegregation program implemented in the 1978–79 academic 
year in Seattle after community groups threatened to sue the mayor for failing to 
facilitate meaningful desegregation efforts in the schools.48 Known as Initiative 350, 
it provided that no school board could directly or indirectly require students to 
attend schools that were not geographically closest to the students’ places of 
residence: thus, on its face, the initiative employed racially neutral language despite 
pertaining wholly to racial matters.49 
In a 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court struck down the Initiative on equal 
protection grounds, holding that it curtailed the ability of minorities to fully 
participate in the political life of their communities.50 Acknowledging that equal 
protection extends to those instances where the political structure “subtly distorts 
governmental processes in such a way as to place special burdens on the ability of 
 
45. Id. at 140. 
46. In a Ninth Circuit case, Valeria v. Davis, the court interpreted what it termed “political 
structure” equal protection as only applicable to “reallocation[s] of political decision making . . . when 
there is evidence of purposeful racial discrimination.” 307 F.3d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 2002). The court 
stated that conventional equal protection analysis and political restructure analysis both required 
“demonstrable evidence of purposeful racial discrimination.” Id. (citation omitted). 
47. 458 U.S. 457. 
48. Id. at 462. 
49. Id. The Initiative made an exception for those with special education needs or who could 
demonstrate health and safety hazards between their place of residence and the nearest school. Id. It 
was held to be unconstitutional by both the district court and the Ninth Circuit, with both courts relying 
upon Hunter and Nyquist to support their reasoning. Id. at 466. The Ninth Circuit stated that subjecting 
desegregative student assignments to unique treatment—that is, by permitting busing for nonracial 
reasons but forbidding it for racial reasons—the Initiative “create[d] a constitutionally-suspect racial 
classification and radically restructure[d] the political process of Washington by allowing a state-wide 
majority to usurp traditional local authority over local school board educational policies.” Seattle  
Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. State of Wash., 633 F.2d 1338, 1344 (9th Cir. 1980). To this extent, the Ninth Circuit 
adopted Hunter ’ s articulation of what constituted an explicit racial classification sufficient to compel 
strict scrutiny. But it also went further with its emphasis on the impermissible restructuring of local 
political processes, a point that later cases would seize on when advancing the doctrine. 
50. See Seattle, 458 U.S. at 467. 
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minority groups to achieve beneficial legislation,”51 the Court spoke approvingly of 
Hunter where this principle had “received its clearest expression”52: 
[T]he political majority may generally restructure the political process to 
place obstacles in the path of everyone seeking to secure the benefits of 
governmental action. But a different analysis is required when the State 
allocates governmental power nonneutrally, by explicitly using the racial 
nature of a decision to determine the decisionmaking process.53 
The Hunter principle was described, then, as a different analytical approach to 
an equal protection challenge, rather than merely a different substantive posture. 
The Court juxtaposed this formulation of nonneutrality with Justice Harlan’s 
example of the executive veto in Hunter, which applied to all and which could, in 
certain instances, disproportionately impact a minority group. Nonneutrality, on the 
other hand, required a different and more heightened analysis, because when “the 
racial nature of an issue [is used] to define the governmental decisionmaking 
structure . . . [that] impos[es] substantial and unique burdens on racial minorities.”54 
Seattle’s articulation of the dangers of political restructuring rested less so on a 
discriminatory impact theory and more on the role that race played in restructuring 
a decision making process: under Seattle, the Hunter doctrine was catalyzed when 
the “racial nature” of a decision fixed the terms for changing the existent political 
process.55 
The second major case to expand the Hunter principle56 and, in many respects, 
the true predecessor of Schuette, was Coalition for Economic Equity  
v. Wilson,57 which, like Schuette, addressed the constitutionality of a state 
constitutional amendment banning affirmative action or the granting of 
“preferential treatment” to “any individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, 
ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, public 




53. Id. at 470 (emphasis in original). 
54. Id. 
55. See Vikram D. Amar & Evan H. Caminker, Equal Protection, Unequal Political Burdens, and 
the CCRI, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1019, 1029 (1996). 
56. The U.S. Supreme Court also addressed the political process doctrine in Crawford v. Bd. of 
Educ. of L.A., 458 U.S. 527, 540–41 (1982), where it rejected the plaintiffs’ reliance upon Hunter 
because the state constitutional amendment in Crawford conformed the state’s desegregation busing 
policy to the federal standard. 
57. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. at 1493, vacated, 110 F.3d 1431. Judge Henderson later characterized 
his opinion in this case as “probably as careful a decision as I’ve ever drawn up.” Howard Mintz, Federal 
Judge Thelton Henderson: Bay Area Legal Legend Takes on Oakland Police Case, SAN JOSE 
MERCURY NEWS (Dec. 11, 2012), http://www.mercurynews.com/ci_22169178/federal-judge-
thelton-henderson-bay-area-legal-legend [https://perma.cc/C9AQ-8CP9]. 
58. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. at 1488 (addressing CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31(a)). The amendment 
contains three exceptions to prohibitions on race- and sex-conscious affirmative action programs: sex-
based bona fide occupational qualifications, the preservation of existing consent decrees,  
and race- and sex-conscious actions required as a condition of eligibility for federal funding.  
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 31 (c)–(e). 
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the incarnation of the “political restructuring doctrine” or what he referred to as the 
Seattle-Hunter doctrine.59 This new description of the doctrine reflects an 
understanding that Seattle did not simply appropriate Hunter; it expanded on it. 
Underscoring the Supreme Court’s decision in Seattle, Judge Henderson 
described the new doctrine as standing for the “simple but central principle” that 
“[t]he political majority may generally restructure the political process to place 
obstacles in the path of everyone seeking to secure the benefits of governmental 
action. [But] the State [may not] allocate governmental power nonneutrally by 
explicitly using the racial nature of a decision to determine the decisionmaking 
process.”60 Deriving a framework from Hunter and Seattle which he, in turn, applied 
to Proposition 209, Judge Henderson pushed what he identified as a “principle” 
closer toward the status of a legal doctrine, “designed to determine whether facially 
neutral enactments single out race and gender issues for unique political burdens, 
and thus are suspect classifications.”61 
Coalition for Economic Equity was filed on November 6, 1996, a day after 
California voters passed Proposition 209. Prior to Election Day, registered voters 
received a California Ballot Pamphlet created by a nonpartisan California Legislative 
Analyst’s Office charged with analyzing each statewide initiative on the ballot that 
year. The Pamphlet included information underscoring how Proposition 209 would 
effectively eliminate state and local government race- and sex-conscious affirmative 
action programs, which aimed “to increase opportunities for various groups—
including women and racial and ethnic minority groups.”62 Furthermore, the 
Pamphlet included “partisan arguments submitted by proponents and opponents 
of the initiative” aimed at educating the electorate.63 Proponents of the Proposition 
spoke of ending “REVERSE DISCRIMINATION” in order to avoid a parade of 
horribles, and framed the Proposition as a modern day incarnation of the 1960s 
Civil Rights Movement.64 Opponents, on the other hand, explained how the 
Proposition would “put[ ] the brakes on expanding opportunities for people in 
need” by eliminating programs that had helped minorities and women on their path 
toward equality.65 This debate attracted national attention. At the time, Bill Clinton 
was running for his second term of office against Senator Bob Dole. Both 
 
59. Id. at 1499–1510. 
60. Id. at 1500 (citing Seattle, 458 U.S. at 470). 
61. Id. at 1503. 
62. Id. at 1493. For example, the Pamphlet addressed the potential impact of Proposition 209 
on admissions to state public universities and the possibility of “fundamental changes to[ ] voluntary 
desegregation programs run by school districts . . . includ[ing] the special funding given to (1) ‘magnet’ 
schools (in those cases where race or ethnicity are preferential factors in the admission of students to 
the schools), and (2) designated ‘racially isolated minority schools’ that are located in areas with high 
proportions of racial or ethnic minorities . . . .” Id. at 1493–94. 
63. Id. at 1494. 
64. Id. 
65. Id. at 1494–95. 
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candidates included their position on Proposition 209 as a part of their party 
platforms that year.66 
Had the Proposition mentioned nothing of preferential treatment, it would 
have been uncontroversial and unnecessary, merely mimicking the language of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and its guarantee of equal protection. However, as the 
district court stated: “[T]he people of California meant to do something more than 
simply restate existing law when they adopted Proposition 209.”67 By prohibiting 
state government entities from adopting race-conscious policies designed to address 
past and present discrimination—policies that had already passed the most exacting 
form of judicial review—Judge Henderson interpreted the Proposition as a cunning 
attempt to strip minorities and women of political leverage. 
In order to demonstrate how the Proposition restructured the political process 
along impermissible racial lines, the court derived a framework from Hunter and 
Seattle for evaluating when the removal of authority to address a racial problem 
created a racial classification in itself.68 This framework dispensed with the intent 
requirement inaugurated in Washington v. Davis69 and affirmed in Arlington Heights.70 
These cases established that “[p]roof of a racially discriminatory intent or purpose 
is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause . . . .”71 However, in 
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, the Supreme Court held that the existence of a 
racial classification, irrespective of proof of animus, compelled strict scrutiny under 
equal protection analysis.72 Given the intrinsic problems with proving 
discriminatory animus in the context of a voter initiative, the district court focused 
on the ability of facially neutral language to operate as a racial classification.73 
Borrowing from Seattle, the court stated that one must look to whether an initiative 
singled out an issue that was of special concern for minorities and “imposed special 
political burdens on those who supported the issue.”74 Proof of animus was 
therefore replaced with a species of disparate impact analysis, specifically tailored 
to claims concerning equal access to the political process. 
 
66. 1996 Democratic Party Platform, THE AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, 
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=29611 [https://perma.cc/QU8R-4AVU] (last visited  
Nov. 11, 2016); 1996 Republican Party Platform, THE AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25848 [https://perma.cc/5RCB-KQLR] (last visited Nov. 11, 
2016). 
67. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. at 1489. Two central legal issues were raised in the case: first, a claim 
about the integrity of the political process and the rights of women and minorities to participate in the 
political process; and second, a claim brought under the Supremacy Clause that the Proposition 
frustrated the State’s ability to comply with Title VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Title 
IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972. Id. at 1489–90. 
68. Id. at 1499–1504. 
69. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976). 
70. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977). 
71. Id. 
72. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 226 (1995). 
73. Wilson, 946 F. Supp. at 1500–01. 
74. Id. at 1500 (citing Seattle, 458 U.S. at 485). 
Final to Printer_Poueymirou (Do Not Delete) 9/19/2017  8:58 AM 
178 UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:167 
In Seattle, the Supreme Court had described the racial nature of Initiative 350 
through three central factors: first, the political campaign surrounding enactment 
of Initiative 350; second, “the perceptions of Washington voters,” and whether 
these voters subjectively believed that the Initiative singled out racial busing for 
unique treatment; third, the “practical effect” of the Initiative.75 This analysis 
informed the district court’s description of the “racial nature” of Proposition 209 
in Coalition for Economic Equity.76 
For example, the district court considered how proponents of the Proposition 
had characterized the initiative for voters and how these characterizations shaped 
voters’ motivations for voting. The court also emphasized that the Proposition was 
of “special interest” to minorities and women because it obfuscated a political 
avenue for obtaining legislation that “inures primarily to the benefit of the minority, 
and is designed for that purpose.”77 In terms of “practical effect,” the court focused 
on how the Proposition would materially alter state practices that determine 
government allocation of benefits and burdens but only in regard to race and gender 
(other forms of preferential treatment would remain undisturbed).78 For all of these 
reasons, the court concluded that Proposition 209 was enacted “because of” not 
merely “in spite of” its adverse affects of affirmative action thereby satisfying the 
threshold established in Washington v. Davis for proving discriminatory purpose.79 
The second stage of the court’s analysis attended to the actual restructuring of 
the political process and employed “the same comparative approach used in 
Seattle.”80 Before Proposition 209, women and minorities could directly petition and 
lobby specific representatives or policymakers with authority to adopt such 
programs and these programs could be approved by a simple majority vote or 
executive decision.81 Further significant, these channels were circumscribed within 
a more localized sphere: for example, in local subdivisions of the government, such 
as school districts, city councils, or county governments. Such channels provided 
an opportunity for citizens to voice their discontent and potentially shape law and 
policy in a more grassroots way. Moreover, this “localized” framework was more 
accessible and more affordable than the path a citizen must tread for securing a 
constitutional amendment through initiative: 
[Proposition 209] required the collection of 693,230 valid signatures. Since 
many signatures are disqualified, in order to ensure the requisite number 
of valid signatures, approximately 50% more “raw” signatures must be 
collected. Because these signatures must be collected within a 150–day 
time limit, a campaign must typically collect up to 7,000 signatures during 
each of the 150 days. Given these requirements, and the size of California, 
 
75. Id. at 1504 (citing Seattle, 458 U.S at 474–75). 
76. Id. at 1500 (citing Seattle, 458 U.S. at 470). 
77. Id. at 1505 (quoting Seattle, 458 U.S. at 472). 
78. Id. at 1504 (citing Seattle, 458 U.S. at 474). 
79. Id. at 1506 (quoting Seattle, 458 U.S. at 471). 
80. Id. 
81. Id. at 1498. 
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hiring paid signature gatherers is a virtual necessity. The cost of obtaining 
signatures runs from $0.70 to $1.50 per signature. Thus, even where 
volunteers gather some portion of the required signatures, the cost of 
securing sufficient signatures, and minimally staffing a few offices, can run 
from $500,000 to $1.5 million. Once the initiative has qualified, it must 
gain majority approval by the voters.82 
The cost and effort required to enact a constitutional amendment through the 
initiative process underscored the nature of the unique political hurdles that 
Proposition 209 introduced to this process for those seeking affirmative action 
legislation. 
Proposition 209 was therefore similar to the initiatives in Hunter and Seattle 
because all three were couched in facially neutral language that masked a racial or 
gender classification, grew out of controversial efforts to undermine remedial 
legislation, and, most importantly, resulted in historically disenfranchised groups no 
longer being able to “use the same political mechanisms that had been available 
prior to the passage of the enactments.”83 Of course states remained free to 
restructure the political process in neutral manners and in ways that indirectly 
burdened the political participation of women and minorities. What a state could 
not do was “single out an issue of special interest to minorities and women and 
require that such legislation run a unique political gauntlet.”84 The perniciousness 
of such legislation was measured in relation to present and future voters, for future 
voters would have to reamend the state constitution to reauthorize the adoption of 
programs that voters of the past had been able to adopt through far less 
cumbersome modes. 
The Ninth Circuit, however, disagreed. Significantly, it divided equal 
protection analysis into two camps: “‘conventional’ equal protection analysis, which 
looks to the substance of the law at issue . . . [and] ‘political structure’ equal 
protection analysis, which looks to the level of government at which the law was 
enacted.”85 Under conventional equal protection analysis, the Ninth Circuit stated 
that Proposition 209 was clearly constitutional.86 Rather than classifying individuals 
on the basis of race or gender, the Proposition prohibited the State from classifying 
on either basis and “[a] law that prohibits the State from classifying individuals by 
race or gender a fortiori does not classify individuals by race or gender.”87 To this 
extent, the court cast the Proposition as a race- and gender-neutral initiative that 
sought to create a race- and gender-neutral world. 
The court then turned to plaintiffs’ challenge that the level of government at 
which the State had decided to prohibited race and gender classifications imposed 
 
82. Id. (citations omitted). 
83. Id. at 1501. 
84. Id. at 1510. 
85. Coal. for Econ. Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 692, 701 (9th Cir. 1997). 
86. Id. 
87. Id. at 702. 
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an “unequal ‘political structure.’”88 Acknowledging that Hunter and Seattle supplied 
the foundation of “political structure” equal protection analysis, the State argued 
that unlike the initiatives in either case, Proposition 209 did not allocate political 
authority in a discriminatory manner.89 Because minorities and women together 
comprise a voting majority, the court adopted CAPD’s argument that “a majority 
of the electorate cannot restructure the political process to discriminate against 
itself.”90 This articulation of what constitutes a “minority” and a “majority” was 
thus based on crude numbers or quantitative rather than qualitative factors.91 Unlike 
the Hunter and Seattle initiatives, which focused on racial minorities, or Colorado’s 
Amendment 2 in Romer v. Evans that targeted gays and lesbians,92 Proposition 209 
neither targeted nor impacted a minority of the population such that political 
structure equal protection analysis was an inappropriate framework for analyzing 
the Proposition’s constitutionality. Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit’s holding and 
reasoning foreshadows the Supreme Court’s decision in Schuette. 
III. SCHUETTE AND THE DEATH OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS DOCTRINE 
Schuette’s path to the Supreme Court was long and arduous. In 2006, Proposal 
2 was adopted during Michigan’s November general election. Conceived and 
sponsored by Ward Connerly, former University of California Regent who had 
previously successfully led the Proposition 209 campaign in California, and Jennifer 
Gratz, the leading plaintiff in Gratz v. Bollinger,93 the Proposal aimed to ban 
affirmative action in Michigan via a citizen-initiated state constitutional amendment. 
It engendered legal controversy even prior to its adoption.94 A suit was filed seeking 
to enjoin its placement on the general election ballot, alleging that its sponsors had 
“used racially targeted voter fraud in contravention of the Voting Rights Act to 
obtain signatures in support of [the] Proposal.”95 The suit proved unsuccessful but 
only because the Proposal’s passage had rendered the case moot. Substantial 
evidence demonstrated that the signature-gathering phase had indeed been “rife 
with fraud and deception.”96 
A week after the Proposal’s adoption, the Coalition to Defend Affirmative 
Action (the “Coalition” plaintiffs)—a student and youth-based organization 
 
88. Id. at 703. 
89. Id. at 704-05. 
90. Id. at 704. 
91. Id. See William M.K. Trochim, Qualitative vs. Quantitative Debate, LOYOLA MARYMOUNT 
UNIV. L.A. RESEARCH ADVANCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE, http://academics.lmu.edu/irb/
qualitativeresearchandapproaches/qualitativevsquantitative/ [https://perma.cc/W22K-KNYM] (last 
visited Nov. 11, 2016). 
92. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 624 (1996). 
93. 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
94. Operation King’s Dream v. Connerly, 501 F.3d 584, 586 (6th Cir. 2007). 
95. Id. 
96. Id. at 591. 
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“committed to making real the promises of American democracy and equality”97—
brought an additional legal challenge to what had become Article I, section 26 of 
the Michigan constitution. A month later, a group of students, faculty, and 
prospective applicants to Michigan’s public universities (the “Cantrell” plaintiffs) 
brought another challenge.98 Both groups argued that the Proposal violated the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Coalition drew upon 
traditional equal protection principles and the less traditional political process 
doctrine;99 the Cantrell plaintiffs challenged the Proposal solely in relation to the 
doctrine first developed in Hunter and Seattle.100 
In one of the most highly publicized Supreme Court opinions of the 2014 
term, Justice Kennedy, writing for the plurality, reversed the Sixth Circuit, which 
had struck down the Proposition in a highly partisan en banc decision. Although 
Justice Kennedy signaled that Schuette was “not about the constitutionality, or the 
merits, of race-conscious admissions policies in higher education . . . but whether, 
and in what manner, voters in the States may choose to prohibit the consideration 
of racial preferences in governmental decisions,”101 the wisdom of affirmative 
action policies played a prominent role in the concurrences and dissents. However, 
and as more fully elaborated below, Schuette’s most memorable passages concern 
the merits of initiative and referenda democracy and the role of the courts in 
policing these political processes. Indeed, Schuette demonstrates the extent to which 
debates over the merits of affirmative action have become embroiled in discourses 
pertaining to federalism, states’ rights, and the virtues of direct democracy. 
Rejecting the Sixth Circuit’s reliance on Seattle and its supporting case law, 
specifically Reitman v. Mulkey102—which Justice Kennedy characterized as the 
“proper beginning point for discussing the controlling decisions,”103—and Hunter, 
Justice Kennedy stated that Schuette was factually and legally distinct for a few 
significant reasons. First, Justice Kennedy’s analysis of both Mulkey and Hunter 
focused on the way that internal state political processes were conscripted to 
promote private discrimination.104 The cases were thus treated as analogous to 
 
97. The group’s full name is “Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration and 
Immigration Rights and Fight for Equality by Any Means Necessary” (BAMN). See About BAMN, 
BAMN: COALITION TO DEFEND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, INTEGRATION AND IMMIGRATION RIGHTS 
AND FIGHT FOR EQUALITY BY ANY MEANS NECESSARY, http://www.bamn.com/about-bamn 
[https://perma.cc/7G4Q-RM6E] ( last visited Nov. 11, 2016). 
98. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 539 F. Supp. 2d 960 
(E.D. Michigan 2008). 
99. See id. at 964. 
100. See id. 
101. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1630 (2014). 
102. 387 U.S. 369 (1967). 
103. Id. at 1631. 
104. Id. at 1631–32. In Mulkey, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down an amendment to the 
California constitution—adopted via ballot initiative—that forbade the state from interfering in an 
individual’s decision not to rent or sell residential property. The Proposition had been adopted in the 
wake of legislation that aimed to regulate private discrimination in residential housing. The Court held 
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Shelley v. Kraemer where the Court held that states could not enforce racial covenants 
in real estate pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment.105 
Second, Justice Kennedy repeatedly emphasized that widespread racial 
discrimination underscored the legal rationale upon which the earlier political 
process cases were based.106 That is, in Mulkey, Hunter, and Seattle to an extent, 
evidence existed of de jure discrimination.107 In regard to Seattle, Justice Kennedy 
pointed to Justice Breyer’s dissent in Parents Involved where he suggested that the 
school busing policies at issue in Seattle were remnants of policies from the 1940s 
and 1950s when de jure segregation was still prevalent.108 Thus, as Justice Kennedy 
stated, “Seattle is best understood as a case in which the state action in question (the 
bar on busing enacted by the State’s voters) had the serious risk, if not purpose, of 
causing specific injuries on account of race, just as had been the case in Mulkey and 
Hunter.”109 What distinguished these cases from Schuette, then, was that “the 
political restriction in question [in all three cases] was designed to be used, or was 
likely to be used, to encourage infliction of injury by reason of race.”110 On the other 
hand, in Schuette, the Court claimed, the law at issue aimed to promote 
antidiscrimination policies rather than target minorities.111 
Third, Justice Kennedy suggested that “[t]he broad language used in Seattle . . . 
went well beyond the analysis needed to resolve the case.”112 Justice Kennedy found 
the Seattle Court’s interpretation of Hunter particularly troubling for establishing “a 
new and far-reaching rationale” that whenever a government policy inured to the 
benefit of minorities and altered the pathways of decision-making power, the policy 
must be evaluated under strict scrutiny.113 The central problem with this rationale 
was that it reinforced the notion that racial groups think and vote alike. Moreover, 
the rule was ultimately unenforceable because it lacked any limiting principle and 
also required courts “to determine the policy realms in which certain groups—
groups defined by race—have a political interest.”114 Thus, while not overturning 
Seattle, the plurality explicitly rebuked Seattle’s doctrinal extension of Hunter. 
Justice Kennedy concluded by turning his focus to direct democracy and the 
importance of allowing voters to determine their own destinies. The “privilege to 
enact laws” was described as “a basic exercise of . . . democratic power.”115 
Michigan’s voters had used this privilege to “bypass public officials who were 
 
that amendment violated equal protection because it “involve[d] the state in private racial 
discriminations to an unconstitutional degree.” 387 U.S. at 378. 
105. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948). 
106. See Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1632. 
107. Id. at 1633. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. at 1638. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. at 1634. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. at 1635. 
115. Id. at 1636. 
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deemed not responsive to the concerns of a majority of the voters.”116 As Justice 
Kennedy stated: 
Were the Court to rule that the question addressed by Michigan voters is 
too sensitive or complex to be within the grasp of the electorate; or that 
the policies at issue remain too delicate to be resolved save by university 
officials or faculties, acting at some remove from immediate public 
scrutiny and control; or that these matters are so arcane that the electorate’s 
power must be limited because the people cannot prudently exercise that 
power even after a full debate, that holding would be an unprecedented 
restriction on the exercise of a fundamental right held not just by one 
person but by all in common. It is the right to speak and debate and learn 
and then, as a matter of political will, to act through a lawful electoral 
process.117 
However, Respondents were not arguing that certain difficult policy questions 
should be removed from the voters and from public discussion.118 Rather, they were 
arguing that the removal of decision-making power from the Board of Regents, but 
only with respect to its race-conscious admissions policies, restructured the existent 
political process by creating comparative structural burdens that directly 
corresponded to racial issues.119 Respondents recognized and indeed stressed the 
fact that the Regents could have abolished race-conscious admission policies, which 
would have had the same immediate substantive effect as a state constitutional 
amendment outlawing affirmative action.120 The only difference was procedural: if 
the Board of Regents decided to change its policy, students and individuals could 
try to change the Regents’ mind through the same means employed by other 
students hoping to influence admission policies. By removing the Regents’ authority 
to shape its admission policies with respect to race only, however, this created two 
separate political processes for students, and the distinction between these 
processes was contingent upon race. 
Chief Justice Roberts, who joined Justice Kennedy’s plurality opinion, wrote 
a short, curt concurrence in which he chastised the dissent for considering it “‘out 
of touch with reality’ to conclude that racial preferences may themselves [be] 
debilitating effect[s] of reinforcing precisely that doubt.”121 Meanwhile, Justice 
Scalia joined by Justice Thomas (neither of whom joined Justice Kennedy’s plurality 
opinion) wrote a long concurrence in which he argued that Hunter and Seattle should 
be overturned for being “[p]atently atextual, unadministrable, and contrary to our 
traditional equal-protection jurisprudence.”122 As to the latter point, Justice Scalia 
 
116. Id. 
117. Id. at 1637. 
118. See Coal. Respondents’ Brief on the Merits at 36–38, Schuette, 134 S. Ct. 1623 (No. 12-
682), 2013 WL 4761325. 
119. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 539 F. Supp. 2d at 933. 
120. Id. at 941. 
121. Schuette, 134 S. Ct. at 1638–39 (Roberts, C.J., concurring) (citing Sotomayor, J., dissenting 
at 1675). 
122. Id. at 1643 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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interpreted the political process doctrine as a species of equal protection still 
utilizing a disparate impact framework. Accordingly, he suggested that the plurality 
had not gone far enough in repudiating the doctrine; rather, Justice Kennedy had 
“reinterpret[ed] [Hunter and Seattle] beyond recognition.”123 
Unlike the plurality, Justice Scalia found Schuette to factually mirror Hunter and 
Seattle: “The relentless logic of Hunter and Seattle would point to a similar conclusion 
in this case. In those cases, one level of government exercised borrowed authority 
over an apparently ‘racial issue,’ until a higher level of government called the loan. 
So too here.”124 The plurality’s revisionist reading of the case law thus ensured that 
a narrow window of opportunity remained open for striking down a law based on 
its disparate impact in instances when state action posed a heightened risk of causing 
specific injuries on account of race.125 Justice Scalia found this to undercut 
“‘ordinary principles of our law [and] of our democratic heritage’ [which] require 
‘plaintiffs alleging equal protection violations’ stemming from facially neutral acts 
to ‘prove intent and causation and not merely the existence of racial disparity.’”126 
For Justice Scalia, the doctrine was a relic of a bygone era in equal protection 
jurisprudence, which Washington v. Davis and its progeny had “squarely and 
soundly” replaced.127 
Justice Scalia agreed with the plurality that the doctrine’s triggering prong, or 
“the task of determining whether a law that reallocates policymaking authority 
concerns a ‘racial issue,’”128 was highly troubling. What did it mean for something 
to be a racial issue? And who was the correct party to decide this? Such “judicial 
musing” required judges to divide the nation into “racial blocs,” a division that 
necessarily assumed minorities shared certain policy interests.129 Justice Scalia found 
the “racial issue” prong further problematic because it “misread” and recast the 
equal protection clause as only protecting particular groups, in this case, the 
minority and not the majority.130 This led the Justice to challenge the dissent’s 
reliance on Carolene Products: What did it mean for a minority to be discrete and 
insular, and why should this be presumptively interpreted as a political liability rather 
than advantage?131 
In addition to the doctrine’s triggering prong, Justice Scalia found the doctrine 
and its supporting case law further problematic for “nearly swallow[ing] the rule of 
structural state sovereignty”132: 
 
123. Id. at 1642. 
124. Id. at 1641. 
125. See id. at 1640. 
126. Id. (quoting Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 506 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring)). 
127. Id. at 1647. 
128. Id. at 1643 (quoting Seattle, 458 U.S. at 473). 
129. Id. at 1643–44 (quoting Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 603, 610 (1990) 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting)). 
130. Id. at 1644. 
131. Id. at 1644–45. 
132. Id. at 1646. 
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If indeed the Fourteenth Amendment forbids States to “place effective 
decisionmaking authority over” racial issues at “different level[s] of 
government,” then it must be true that the Amendment’s ratification in 
1868 worked a partial ossification of each State’s governing structure, 
rendering basically irrevocable the power of any subordinate state official 
who, the day before the Fourteenth Amendment’s passage, happened to 
enjoy legislatively conferred authority over a “racial issue.” Under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, that subordinate entity (suppose it is a city 
council) could itself take action on the issue, action either favorable or 
unfavorable to minorities. It could even reverse itself later. What it could 
not do, however, is redelegate its power to an even lower level of state 
government (such as a city-council committee) without forfeiting it, since 
the necessary effect of wresting it back would be to put an additional 
obstacle in the path of minorities. . . . The mere existence of a 
subordinate’s discretion over the matter would work a kind of reverse pre-
emption. It is “a strange notion—alien to our system—that local 
governmental bodies can forever pre-empt the ability of a State—the 
sovereign power—to address a matter of compelling concern to the State.” 
But that is precisely what the political-process doctrine contemplates.133 
Moreover, to the extent that citizen-initiated constitutional amendments are 
an aspect of Michigan’s internal political process, Justice Scalia considered it 
inappropriate to even characterize the adoption of Proposal 2 as a political 
restructuring rather than “working through the ‘existing political process.’”134 After 
all, Michigan citizens who supported race-conscious admissions policies could 
simply reamend the state constitution through the exact same process that the 
opponents of race-conscious admission policies had used to successfully ban 
affirmative action: the ballot initiative. Therefore, no restructuring existed. The rules 
of the game remained in place. 
Justice Breyer, in his concurring opinion, also challenged the characterization 
of Proposal 2 as working a political restructuring, but for reasons different than 
Justice Scalia. Instead, he focused on how the Proposal did not shift decision-
making authority from one political level to another, because the Regents delegated 
its admission-related decision-making authority to unelected faculty members and 
administrators.135 Therefore, decision-making authority shifted from an 
administrative process to an electoral process, a shift that ultimately did not diminish 
the ability of minorities “to participate meaningfully in the political process.”136 For 
Justice Breyer, the facts of Schuette substantially deviated from Hunter and Seattle, 
and to apply either case “to the administrative process would, by tending to hinder 
 
133. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
134. Id. at 1647. 
135. Id. at 1650 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
136. Id. at 1651. 
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change, risk discouraging experimentation, interfering with efforts to see when and 
how race-conscious policies work.”137 
The sole dissent, authored by Justice Sotomayor and joined by Justice 
Ginsburg, framed the plurality’s position as a “logic embrac[ing] majority rule 
without an important constitutional limit.”138 Justice Sotomayor painted a portrait 
of American history as one defined by persistent attempts to disenfranchise 
minority voices through political restructurings. First, the majority acted with an 
“open, invidious purpose,” then through “outright bans on voting with literacy 
tests, good character requirements, poll taxes, and gerrymandering,” and finally 
through direct democracy initiatives like Proposition 2, which changed “the ground 
rules of the process so as to make it more difficult for the minority, and the minority 
alone, to obtain policies designed to foster racial integration.”139 The political 
process doctrine, Justice Sotomayor argued, had operated as “a central check on 
majority rule” that was grounded in, and justified by, the Fourteenth 
Amendment.140 Without it, minority groups in this country, historically 
disenfranchised and vulnerable, were further alienated from the protections of 
federal courts and the Fourteenth Amendment. 
All in all, then, four of the Justices considered Hunter and Seattle factually 
analogous to Schuette, the other four not. Some of the Justices believed that the 
political process doctrine, and the cases upon which it relied, should be overruled 
because the doctrine was inconsistent with equal protection jurisprudence in its 
current form. Other Justices found the doctrine to be salvageable but only 
applicable in the rarest of occasions. And still others found the doctrine 
constitutionally viable despite the direction that equal protection jurisprudence had 
taken. 
IV. SCHUETTE’S AFTERLIFE: THE SAME-SEX MARRIAGE CASES 
It is unclear what (if anything) of the political process doctrine survives Justice 
Kennedy’s plurality decision in Schuette. As Justice Scalia and Justice Sotomayor 
noted, the decision reinterpreted the seminal political process cases beyond 
recognition, infusing even greater doctrinal confusion into an already complicated 
body of case law.141 Perhaps this is because the cases appeared to provide an 
alternative avenue for triggering heightened judicial review that did not require 
proof of intent to discriminate. Thus, the doctrine appeared out-of-sync with the 
direction the Court’s equal protection jurisprudence has taken since Washington v. 
Davis. Yet, rather than overturning Hunter and Seattle, Justice Kennedy reinterpreted 
the cases, and the doctrine they developed, to stand for the proposition that when 
the reapportionment of political power triggers the “infliction of a specific 
 
137. Id. 
138. Id. at 1654 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
139. Id. at 1652. 
140. Id. at 1667. 
141. Id. at 1640, 1662–64. 
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injury,”142 this may provide a sufficient basis for bringing an equal protection 
challenge.143 It remains to be seen how this rule will be used going forward. 
However, if Schuette’s immediate afterlife is any indication of its longer-lasting 
contribution to the legal landscape, it is possible that the case will be remembered 
and cited more for both its triumphant avowal of direct democracy and deft weaving 
together of core federalist principles with voter initiatives into one cohesive 
narrative. Within months of the Court’s decision in Schuette, it had been invoked by 
several lower courts, almost entirely within the context of the same-sex marriage 
cases, and usually because state officials tasked with defending voter-initiated same-
sex marriage bans have turned to Schuette for support.144 Defenders of same-sex 
marriage bans have cited the case as an example of the Supreme Court’s implicit 
approval of direct democracy and the importance of allowing the will of the voters 
to shape their destinies without court interference.145 
In Latta v. Otter, for example—a recent Idaho district court decision 
overturning the state’s same-sex marriage ban—Governor Otter defended the 
state’s position in part by analogizing the ban on same-sex marriage to Proposal 2’s 
prohibition of affirmative action.146 Defendants interpreted Schuette to signify that 
“‘a state’s voters can ban preferences’ and that courts should ‘let[ ] the people make 
difficult policy choices through democratic means.’”147 The district court rejected 
this analogy, suggesting that Schuette “stands for the unremarkable proposition that 
voters can and should be allowed to end their state’s discriminatory policies.”148 
Meanwhile, in Bostic v. Schaefer, the Fourth Circuit rejected Virginia’s argument 
that a “federalism-based interest in defining marriage” was a sufficient justification 
for Virginia’s prohibition against same-sex marriage.149 In a section  
of the opinion entitled “Federalism,” the court found proponents’ reliance  
on Schuette unavailing.150 Proponents had argued that like Proposal 2, the Marshall/
Newman Amendment outlawing same-sex marriage constituted “the codification 
of Virginians’ policy choice in a legal arena that is fraught with intense social and 
 
142. Id. at 1636 (majority opinion). 
143. In one recent state appellate court case, the court interpreted the political process doctrine 
post-Schuette as “stand[ing] for the proposition that the reapportionment of legislative  
power may be challenged only where a serious risk of ‘specific injuries from hostile  
discrimination [are] at issue.’” Howe v. Haslam, No. M2013-01790-COA-R3CV, 2014 WL 5698877, at 
*23 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 4, 2014). 
144. Robicheaux v. Caldwell, No. CIV.A. 13-5090, 2014 WL 4347099, at *927 n.20  
(E.D. La. Sept. 3, 2014) (“This case shares striking similarities with Schuette.”); Wolf v. Walker,  
986 F. Supp. 2d 982, 996 (W.D. Wis. 2014) (rejecting Defendants’ and amici’s reliance on Schuette 
because the case dealt with a law prohibiting rather than requiring discrimination); Latta v. Otter, 19  
F. Supp. 3d 1054, 1085 (D. Idaho 2014). 
145. See, e.g., Wolf, 986 F. Supp. 2d at 996; Latta, 19 F. Supp. 3d at 1085. 
146. Latta, 19 F. Supp. 3d at 1085. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. 
149. Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 379–80 (4th Cir. 2014). 
150. Id. at 378–80. 
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political debate.”151 The Fourth Circuit disagreed with the notion that voters could 
determine the outcome on this issue. Although it acknowledged that voting was 
“essential to our democracy,” the court stressed that “the people’s will is not an 
independent compelling interest that warrants depriving same-sex couples of their 
fundamental right to marry.”152 
However, in DeBoer v. Snyder, the Sixth Circuit upheld same-sex marriage bans 
in Michigan, Kentucky, and Tennessee, as well as Ohio’s refusal to recognize out-
of-state same-sex marriages.153 Judge Sutton, writing for a 2–1 majority, suggested 
that the rationale underscoring Schuette “appl[ied] with equal vigor”154 to the central 
question in DeBoer, namely, “Who decides? Is this a matter that the National 
Constitution commits to resolution by the federal courts or leaves to the less 
expedient, but usually reliable, work of the state democratic processes?”155 
Borrowing greatly from Justice Kennedy’s language in Schuette, Judge Sutton’s 
decision was centrally underscored by that “key insight[ ] of federalism,” which 
permits states to serve as laboratories for experimenting with vastly different public 
policies.156 And, indeed, throughout the decision there is palpable tension between 
what Judge Sutton describes as “the democracy-versus-litigation path to same-sex 
marriage”157 or the creation of laws and policies that emerge from political processes 
shaped by voters as opposed to judges and courts. To invalidate same-sex marriage 
bans passed by a majority of the voters would enable the federal courts to deny “the 
people suffrage over an issue long thought to be within their power.”158 Allowing 
voters to adopt laws or constitutional amendments through an initiative process was 
thus characterized as an incisive expression of federalism and democracy at work. 
Central to Judge Sutton’s decision to uphold the bans is an ironic perception 
of ballot initiatives as a “purer” and more transparent form of democracy—ironic, 
because our very system of representative democracy was founded out of concern 
for protecting minority interests from a tyrannizing majority.159 Consider Justice 
Black’s dissent in Hunter where he expressed incredulousness over the Court’s 
decision to overturn a voter referendum: “In this Government, which we boast is 
‘of the people, by the people, and for the people,’ conditioning the enactment of a 
law on a majority vote of the people condemns that law as unconstitutional in the 
eyes of the Court!”160 In James v. Valtierra, Justice Black, writing for the majority, 
continued this line of defense when he argued that “[p]rovisions for referendums 
 
151. Id. at 379. 
152. Id. 
153. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 421 (6th Cir. 2014). 
154. Id. at 395–96, 409. 
155. Id. at 396. 
156. Id. at 406. 
157. Id. at 402. 
158. Id. 
159. See, for example, Madison’s Federalist No. 51 where he suggested that “[i]f a majority be 
united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 
( James Madison). 
160. Hunter, 393 U.S. at 397 (Black, J., dissenting). 
Final to Printer_Poueymirou (Do Not Delete) 9/19/2017  8:58 AM 
2017] DEATH OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 189 
demonstrate devotion to democracy, not to bias, discrimination, or prejudice.”161 
Meanwhile, Justice Scalia, in his dissent from the grant of certiorari in Equal 
Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, suggested that when the Court overturns a voter 
referendum, it signals that “nowhere in the country may the people decide, in 
democratic fashion, not to accord special protection to homosexuals,”162 as if to 
suggest that the initiative form itself immunized its substance from constitutional 
scrutiny. 
More recently, this faith in the purity of the referenda process found life in 
Justice Kennedy’s dissenting opinion in Hollingsworth v. Perry.163 Disagreeing with 
the majority’s analysis of the plaintiffs’ alleged lack of standing, Justice Kennedy 
stated:  
The essence of democracy is that the right to make law rests in the people 
and flows to the government, not the other way around. Freedom resides 
first in the people without need of a grant from government. The 
California initiative process embodies these principles and has done so for 
over a century.164 
For Justice Kennedy, the plaintiffs had standing to challenge an adverse Ninth 
Circuit ruling when the state refused to do so itself, because they were able to 
demonstrate a sincere and personally felt injury in not having their vote counted.165 
For the dissent, failing to recognize this as an injury was a direct affront to the whole 
enterprise of direct democracy.166 It is hard not to read certain passages concerning 
the scope of popular sovereignty in a constitutional system in Justice Kennedy’s 
plurality decision in Schuette as vindicating his position in Perry. 
Although direct democracy is superficially appealing, many scholars have 
argued that ballot initiatives are antithetical to the structure and spirit of our 
Constitution and the architecture of democracy that our Founders created.167 Direct 
 
161. Valtierra, 402 U.S. at 141. Professor Eule recounts the following exchange during oral 
argument in Reitman v. Mulkey:  
[T]hen Solicitor General Thurgood Marshall called attention to the fact that California’s 
authorization of discrimination in the private housing market had been enacted by voter 
initiative. “Wouldn’t you have exactly the same argument,” he was asked, if the provision 
“had been enacted by the California legislature?” “It’s the same argument,” Marshall replied, 
“I just have more force with this.” “No,” interjected Justice Black, “It seems to me you would 
have less. Because here, it’s moving in the direction of letting the people of the State—the 
voters of the State—establish their policy, which is as near to a democracy as you can get.”  
Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1506 (1990). 
162. Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. Cincinnati, 518 U.S. 1001, 1001 (1996) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting) (arguing that certiorari should have been denied, and that Equality Foundation of Greater 
Cincinnati is distinguishable from Romer v. Evans). 
163. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2675 (2013) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
164. Id. 
165. Id. at 2669–70. 
166. Id. at 2671. 
167. For critiques of direct democracy, see generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Challenging Direct 
Democracy, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 293 (2007); Robin Charow, Judicial Review, Equal Protection and the 
Problem with Plebiscites, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 527 (1994); Gunn, supra note 2; Eule, supra  
note 161, at 1555 (“The legislative process . . . affords minority groups a role that they lack in the 
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democracy fails to vet unconscious bias and in so doing, facilitates the majorities’ 
tyranny over the minority. Direct democracy initiatives enable voters to develop and 
adopt laws that legislators would likely have a far more onerous time enacting due 
to their need to please their varied constituents.168 James Madison articulated a 
similar point when discussing the virtues of a democratic republic. In Federalist Paper 
No. 10, Madison disparaged what he termed “pure democracy” precisely because it 
undermined minority interests.169 Madison argued: 
A scheme of representation . . . open[ed] a different prospect . . . refin[ing] 
and enlarg[ing] the public views, by passing them through the medium of 
a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest 
of their country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely 
to sacrifice it to temporary or partial considerations.170 
If we return to that imagined South Dakota initiative at the start of this 
Note—which required a supermajority in both Houses for the enactment of  
any law pertaining to the spending of state funds in public education for 
noncitizens—it is unlikely that noncitizens in South Dakota (assuming they 
constituted a small minority and that they were interested in defeating this 
initiative171) would ever be able to successfully defeat this law unless others in the 
community joined their cause. Due to sheer numbers, as well as political access, 
literacy and education, and other factors, certain groups will be uniquely 
disadvantaged within the referendum and initiative process while other groups will 
be at an advantage. The resultant political process will, in turn, construct a majority 
that will further retrench minority interests.172 Thus, while “statewide initiative[s] 
may be a legitimate process for enacting a gross receipts tax,” courts should be wary 
 
substitutive plebiscite.”); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Referendum: Democracy’s Barrier to Racial Equality, 54 
WASH. L. REV. 1, 1 (1978) (“[T]he experience of black [voters] with the referendum has proved 
ironically that the more direct democracy becomes, the more threatening it is.”). 
168. See KENNETH P. MILLER, DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND THE COURTS 101–25 (2009) 
(tracing courts’ evolving analyses of direct democracy initiatives). 
169. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 ( James Madison). 
170. Id. 
171. Justice Kennedy devotes a considerable amount of time in his plurality decision to 
critiquing the notion of racial voting blocs or the idea that minorities think alike and would vote 
according to common interests. Although it is always problematic to assume that certain races or 
genders favor certain social policies—e.g., that all woman favor enhanced protection from pregnancy 
discrimination or that all immigrants are more favorably invested in immigration reform—it is also 
naïve to discredit the fact that groups often do share common values and interests, which in turn affects 
their voting patterns, particularly when they are disenfranchised within the political system. One need 
only look at the voting patterns in Michigan when Proposal 2 was adopted: 59% of white voters 
supported the Proposal compared with 14% of black voters. See Scott Jaschik, Michigan Votes Down 
Affirmative Action, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Nov. 8, 2006), https://www.insidehighered.com/news/
2006/11/08/michigan [https://perma.cc/5YCD-K3W4]. These racial differences cannot be chalked 
up to statistical error; rather, they suggest that groups that considered themselves to be disadvantaged 
by a particular policy were disinclined to vote favorably for that policy. 
172. See Stephen M. Rich, Ruling by Political Numbers: Political Restructuring and the 
Reconsideration of Democratic Commitments After Romer v. Evans, 109 YALE L.J. 587, 625–26 (1999). 
Final to Printer_Poueymirou (Do Not Delete) 9/19/2017  8:58 AM 
2017] DEATH OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS 191 
when they have the effect of “raising social barriers between groups of citizens.”173 
Judicial review therefore, plays a particularly important role when direct democracy 
initiatives affect, directly or indirectly, minority rights.174 
V. A CASE FOR ENTRENCHMENT 
But perhaps all is not lost. A different strategy for litigation may rest with an 
entirely different line of case law that is nonetheless similarly preoccupied with 
protecting the political process: entrenchment. 
Entrenchment refers to “statutes or internal legislative rules that are binding 
against subsequent legislative action in the same form.”175 Laws that are “binding” 
are laws that include provisions that cannot be ignored or waived.176 Professors 
Chemerinsky and Roberts identify two types of entrenchment: “substantive” 
entrenchment, which constitutes “the legal (as opposed to political, social, or 
economic) requirements which would completely prevent a future legislature from 
amending or repealing an Act of Congress,” and “procedural” entrenchment, which 
refers to legislative provisions that must be followed by future legislatures 
attempting to repeal or amend the law.177 The imagined South Dakota initiative at 
the start of this Note would be an example of procedural entrenchment. It does not 
completely prevent future voters from modifying or repealing the initiative; rather, 
it makes it exceedingly more onerous for future voters to do so. 
In 1853, the Supreme Court first addressed the constitutionality of legislative 
entrenchment in Ohio Life Insurance & Trust Co. v. Debolt.178 The case concerned 
whether Ohio had relinquished its right of taxation in its charter to a bank. The 
Court held that this form of entrenchment was unconstitutional because “no one 
legislature can, by its own act, disarm their successors of any of the powers or rights 
of sovereignty confided by the people to the legislative body.”179 Therefore, no state 
could form a contract that “deprive[d] a future legislature of the power of imposing 
any tax it may deem necessary for the public service—or of exercising any other act 
 
173. Hans A. Linde, When Initiative Lawmaking Is Not “Republican Government”: The Campaign 
Against Homosexuality, 72 OR. L. REV. 19, 31 (1993). 
174. The Sixth Circuit emphasized this point in Equal Foundation of Greater Cincinnati,  
Inc. v. Cincinnati, 838 F. Supp. 1235 (S.D. Ohio 1993). Noting that “an essential principal of our system 
of government is that fundamental constitutional rights are not subject to popular vote,” the court 
stated that among its most important functions as a judiciary was “to ensure that the constitutional 
rights of the few or the powerless are not infringed because their views are unpopular with the majority.” 
Id. at 1236. “Without these principals,” the court remarked, “and without the independence of the 
federal courts to preserve them, ours would not be a democracy at all but rather a tyranny at the whim 
of the majority.” Id. 
175. Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 YALE 
L.J. 1665, 1667 (2002). 
176. John C. Roberts & Erwin Chemerinsky, Entrenchment of Ordinary Legislation: A Reply to 
Professors Posner and Vermeule, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 1773, 1778 (2003). 
177. Id. at 1779. 
178. 57 U.S. 416 (1853). 
179. Id. at 431. 
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of sovereignty confided to the legislative body” unless the constitution expressly 
provided a state with this power.180 
Twenty-six years later, in Newton v. Mahoney County Commissioners, the Court 
acknowledged that states could enter into certain kinds of contractual obligations 
that circumscribed their sovereignty.181 The Court reconfirmed the Dartmouth 
College Case,182 which bolstered the Contract Clause by precluding the ability of 
states to interfere with private contracts. However, Justice Swayne, writing for the 
majority, drew a distinction between private contracts and contracts “involv[ing] 
public interest” or which operated as “public laws.”183 The Court stated that “[e]very 
succeeding legislature possesses the same jurisdiction and power with respect to 
them as its predecessors. The latter have the same power of repeal and modification 
which the former had of enactment, neither more nor less. All occupy, in this 
respect, a footing of perfect equality.”184 
The Court’s description of the problems with legislative entrenchment were 
anchored in the Court’s acknowledgement that values change and that it was “vital 
to the public welfare that each [legislature] should be able at all times to do whatever 
the varying circumstances and present exigencies touching the subject involved may 
require.”185 Entrenchment undermined the states’ abilities to repeal and modify 
legislation in order to appropriately address these changing societal needs. To 
enshrine the values of one set of voters and impose these values upon future voters 
is not only counter-progressive but also undemocratic. No one today would want 
to be bound to the views held by the majority of our country in 1896. 
Numerous scholars have argued that legislative and constitutional 
entrenchment is inconsistent with foundational principles of democracy.186 Current 
legislatures should not be allowed to bind future legislatures. Nor should a majority 
of voters today be able to bind all future voters by adopting laws that cannot be 
overturned or which are uniquely cumbersome to repeal or modify. In this respect, 
the idea of entrenchment provides a useful frame for understanding the issues at 
stake in the political process cases including Schuette. Indeed, these cases merge the 
constitutional issues surrounding entrenchment with the constitutional issues 
underscoring equal protection. Although the cases articulated the equal protection 
violation in relation to changing the locus of decision-making power, reallocations 




181. Newton v. Mahoning Cty. Comm’rs, 100 U.S. 548, 556–57 (1879). 
182. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518 (1819). 
183. Newton, 100 U.S. at 559. 
184. Id. at 559. 
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186. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 176, at 1775–76 (“Entrenchment is ‘inconsistent with the 
democratic principle that present majorities rule themselves.’”) (quoting Michael J. Klarman, 
Majoritarian Judicial Review: The Entrenchment Problem, 85 GEO. L.J. 491, 509 (1997). 
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Indeed, the political process doctrine is simultaneously a doctrine about 
entrenchment. In Wilson I, for example, the district court’s concerns about 
Proposition 209’s restructuring of the political process parallel concerns over the 
constitutionality of legislative and constitutional forms of entrenchment.187 The way 
that the Proposition subverted the ability of a particular class of voters to participate 
in the political process by undermining their access to local channels of advocacy is 
a version of procedural entrenchment. The issue for Judge Henderson was not just 
that the Proposition repealed all existing state and local affirmative action programs, 
but also that it made the adoption of such programs in the future far more difficult 
to effectuate.188 Perhaps, then, as we move forward, the language and jurisprudence 
of entrenchment will supply a new approach for advancing an old challenge. 
CONCLUSION 
Facially neutral ballot initiatives are completely ill-suited to present day 
heightened judicial review for the sole reason that courts require an examination of 
intent in order to sustain a finding of discrimination. The effect of this new intent 
threshold has been the focus of considerable scholarly work, much of which has 
been critical.189 Many laws that disparately impact minority groups have been upheld 
because plaintiffs have been unable to satisfy the Court’s discriminatory purpose 
requirement, leading some scholars to argue that the goals of the Fourteenth 
Amendment have been lost inside the Court’s application of it.190 Moreover, in 
certain contexts, discriminatory purpose is inherently more difficult if not 
impossible to prove. In terms of facially neutral ballot initiatives that allegedly 
disadvantage minorities, the discriminatory purpose requirement erects an obstacle 
unlikely to be overcome because determining the secret motivations of voters is 
nearly impossible. 
An active federal judiciary is thus needed to keep direct democracy initiatives 
in line with the Constitution. In Democracy and Distrust, Professor Ely suggested that 
because “[t]he Constitution has . . . proceeded from the quite sensible assumption 
that an effective majority will not inordinately threaten its own rights, and has 
sought to assure that such a majority not systematically treat others less well than it 
treats itself,”191 judges should intervene when democracy malfunctions. In order to 
ensure a healthy, functioning democracy rather than any particular fundamental 
values, Ely stressed the importance of protecting the procedures that sustain 
democratic values.192 
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This notion was expanded in Professor Eule’s essay Judicial Review of Direct 
Democracy in which he argued “the gap between the will of the majority and the 
voice of the legislature is there by constitutional design,”193 but is also, ultimately, 
desirable. The government has an obligation to all of its citizens. The Constitution 
honors this obligation by investing plenary lawmaking authority in representatives 
rather than “the people,” dividing power between different branches of government 
so that each acts as a check on the other, while “placing certain principles beyond 
the reach of ordinary majorities.”194 Because “direct democracy bypasses internal 
safeguards designed to filter out or negate factionalism, prejudice, tyranny, and self-
interest,” judges must take “a harder look”195 at these initiatives in order to protect 
“the Constitution’s representational values.”196 Eule recognized the failure of strict 
scrutiny: so long as courts maintained the burden of proving discriminatory intent, 
strict scrutiny would almost assuredly never apply to a ballot initiative.197 He 
suggested that either this burden should be relaxed, enabling more creative ways for 
satisfying it, or, in the context of plebiscitary settings, the requirements should be 
abandoned altogether.198 
The political process doctrine has, since its inception with Hunter, 
encapsulated the tension that exists between direct democracy and judicial review 
when minority rights are at stake. Direct democracy implicates unique issues 
concerning the ability of voters to decide their own fate, determine their own 
procedures, and be active participants in a scheme of self-government. But as our 
Founders recognized, leaving the protection of minority interests to purely 
majoritarian processes is contrary to our democratic values.199 If the political 
process doctrine died with Schuette, the spirit of the doctrine did not, and perhaps 
the jurisprudence of entrenchment provides a new avenue for ensuring that the will 












193. Eule, supra note 161, at 1514. 
194. Id. at 1549. 
195. Id. 
196. Id. at 1559. 
197. Id. at 1561–62. 
198. Id. at 1562. 
199. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 169. 
